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Executive Summary 
 
The United Kingdom higher education system has to date been characterised by all 
undergraduate students paying a unique price irrespective of the institution attended. 
Recently, a group of research-orientated universities has been arguing that the higher 
average earnings achieved by their graduates stems from the quality of the teaching 
provided. As the provision of high quality teaching is costly, these institutions have 
lobbied for the right to charge higher fees. 
 
This claim that prestigious institutions provide higher financial returns to their 
graduates has not been clearly illustrated to date. As more prestigious university attract 
students of higher academic ability and with different backgrounds than students 
registering at modern institutions, a simple comparison of the earnings can be 
misleading as it does not account for pre-university personal and academic 
characteristics. 
 
Using three cohorts of graduates in 1985, 1990 and 1995, we control for the selection of 
individuals into different types of university using a Propensity Score Matching 
method. We show that there are substantial variations in the quality of the teaching 
provided as reflected by differences in the wages achieved by graduates attending 
different types of higher education institution. 
 
Specifically, even after accounting for personal characteristics graduating from a 
Russell Group institution adds between 0 and 6% to an male graduate’s earnings 
compared to graduating from a Modern university and 2.5% for women in the younger 
cohorts Teaching Quality as represented by earnings returns within different types of 
institution  also differs widely. The effects of teaching quality on wage growth are 
unclear and we are unable to conclude whether quality effects result in temporary or 
permanent increases in earnings. There is also some evidence that with the expansion of 
higher education, the heterogeneity between institution types has increased while 
heterogeneity within types has decreased. 
 
We use these estimates of the returns to the type of institution attended to predict prices 
in the higher education market if institutions were left with the freedom to set their 
tuition fees. Under various scenarios, we estimate a fee differential between prestigious 
and less prestigious universities ranging from £2,950 to£7,250. This range of tuition 
fees is in line with the current inter-quartile range observed in the US among private 
institutions. A tuition fee differential of £4,000 is also equivalent to the reported 
differences in academic expenditures between the institutions but larger than the 
maximum top-up fee proposed in the current government White Paper (£3,000). These 
results suggest that by implementing a unique price of higher education, the 
government currently subsidises graduates attending more prestigious institutions more 
generously than others and that there is some justification in the claim that institutions 
should be allowed greater freedom in setting their tuition fees.  
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Does it pay to attend a prestigious university? 
 
Arnaud Chevalier  
Gavan Conlon 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The literature on the returns to education has mostly estimated private returns for an 
average individual. These estimates have been widely used to encourage individuals 
to seek tertiary education. For example, the United Kingdom Government’s recent 
White Paper introducing tuition fee reforms states that “on average those with higher 
education qualifications earn around 50% more than non-graduates” (HMO 2003)1.  
However, average returns may be misleading, and this paper aims to document some 
of the variation in the returns to higher education in the United Kingdom. 
 
Currently, the United Kingdom higher education system imposes a unique price, 
irrespective of the subject of the degree studied or the institution attended. A group of 
research-orientated universities has been arguing that the higher average earnings of 
their graduates stems from the quality of the teaching provided. As teaching quality is 
costly to provide, some of these institutions have lobbied for the right to charge higher 
fees2. The claim that prestigious institutions provide higher financial returns to their 
graduates has not been clearly illustrated to date. The difficulties in comparing the 
returns to different institutions or types of institution originates from the heterogeneity 
of the student populations attending the various types of institution and differences in 
the undergraduate degree courses provided (academic or more vocational courses). 
Due to these selection issues, a simple comparison of the earnings associated with 
graduates attending different institutions can be deceptive3. 
 
This paper aims to provide evidence that returns to higher education vary by the type 
of institution attended even after accounting for the heterogeneity of students. If such 
evidence is found, arguments in favour of differentiated tuition fees could be justified. 
Having a unique price for goods of differing quality would provide an implicit 
subsidy to graduates attending ‘prestigious’ institutions, which could be seen as an 
inequitable policy. 
                                                 
 
1 The 50% premium described refers to the difference in average earnings between those with either 
undergraduate of sub degree qualifications comp ared to those with qualifications strictly below sub 
degree level (Level 3 and below). This estimate is a comparison of the average earnings of the two 
groups and is not regression based. It cannot therefore be considered a return in the general sense. 
2 Following this lobbying, the White Paper on higher education (HMO 2003) has indeed allowed every 
university the right to charge additional fees to undergraduates provided they meet specific 
requirements on widening participation for those individuals from ‘non-traditional’ university 
backgrounds. 
3 Subject of degree and institution also impact on the probability of employment, post-graduate studies 
(Conlon and Chevalier, 2002) or over-education (Chevalier, 2002), but these issues are neglected in 
this paper. 
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Due to selection effects, estimating returns to quality in higher education is not 
straightforward. First, as in the bulk of the literature, we assume linear selection on 
observables; i.e. we control for characteristics that should affect the choice of 
individuals entering different types of institution. However, Black and Smith (2002) 
have recently shown the limit of such estimates, and in particular, two primary 
weaknesses are identified. First, if the sorting of individuals and institutions by ability 
is perfect (or close enough), no talented individual will be observed in a less 
prestigious institution and similarly no less able student would be observed attending 
a prestigious  institution. Thus, institution effects will be identified solely by the 
imposed functional form. This is traditionally referred in the literature as the absence 
of common support problem. Secondly, even if the selection to an institution is based 
on observable variables, the estimates may be biased if the relationship is non linear. 
 
As an alternative estimation strategy, we rely on propensity score matching 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). This estimation strategy identifies institutional effects 
by pairing each individual in a prestigious institution with a “similar” individual in a 
less prestigious university, thus not imposing a functional form. This estimation also 
highlights the difficulties associated with the absence of common support between the 
two populations of students. 
 
In the literature, estimates of quality effects in higher education on earnings are 
ambiguous. Similarly, we find mixed evidence of quality effects in higher education 
in the United Kingdom. Our analysis is based on three cohorts of graduates (1985, 
1990 and 1995), who were surveyed respectively 11, 6 and 3 years after leaving 
university. According to the results of our preferred model specification, we estimate 
that male graduates from a prestigious institution earn between 0 and 6% more than 
graduates from Modern universities. Equivalent female graduates from the more 
recent cohorts earn approximately 2.5% more than female graduates from Modern 
Universities. The evolution of the premium is consistent with higher education in the 
UK becoming more differentiated as it expends. Thus, the premium for attending a 
prestigious institution is larger for the younger cohort than for the older one. For 
females the results are somewhat biased by selection effects. We find that there is no 
premium for attending an old university (non Russell Group) compared to attending a 
Modern Universities.  The quality of teaching has ambiguous effect on wage growth 
but we tentatively support the assumption that the quality effects originates from an 
increase in human capital. 
 
In order to highlight the current debate about university top-up fees in the United 
Kingdom, we simulate the lifetime effect on wages of attending a prestigious  
institution and calculate the fee differential that would equilibrate the returns to higher 
education between the different types of institution. Under various assumptions, we 
report that a tuition fee differential ranging from £3,000 to £7,000 would be expected 
if institutions were left with full freedom to set their tuition fees. Since the differences 
in per student academic expenditures between the institutions are in the lower part of 
this range, there is little evidence that prestigious  institutions are more cost effective 
at providing education than less prestigious universities. 
 
2 The United Kingdom Higher Education system 
 
University education is almost universally provided in publicly funded institutions. A 
primary aim of many UK governments since the 1960s has been to increase the 
proportion of a cohort attending some type of tertiary education. In the 1960s, this aim 
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led to the creation of several new higher education institutions. The upward trend in 
participation has been steep with at least a 50% increase in the age participation index 
(API) each decade. By 2000, 33.4% of a cohort aged less than 21 was in full-time 
undergraduate studies compared to 5.4% in 1960. The increase in participation has 
been concomitant with an increase in the demand for skills, so that the average private 
return to a degree has remained relatively constant over the last two decades 
(Chevalier and Walker, 2001). It can also be noted, that participation is much higher 
for middle class students than for those at the bottom of the social class distribution. 
In fact the gap between these two populations has increased consistently over the 
period (Table 1)4.  
 
To accommodate the drastic change in participation, the higher education sector was 
substantially reformed in the 1990s. Prior to 1992, the United Kingdom higher 
education sector was characterised by two mutually exclusive components. One sector 
comprised research led institutions with degree awarding powers (traditional 
universities) and the other sector comprised polytechnics, which did not have full 
degree awarding powers and provided courses in more vocational orientated subjects. 
In 1992, this degree awarding distinction disappeared and all higher educatio n 
institutions were granted university status and degree awarding powers. We refer to 
the former polytechnic institutions as New or Modern Universities. The institutions 
that possessed degree-awarding powers prior to 1992 are generally referred to as Old 
universities. Within the Old universities, a self selected informal coalition of 19 
research led institutions, often considered to encompass the oldest and most 
prestigious higher education institutions within the United Kingdom, has been 
formed. This group of institutions is referred as the Russell Group 5. Thus, three types 
of universities can be defined: Russell Group, Old universities and Modern 
universities. The three types of university differ by the degree subjects offered and the 
emphasis placed on research and as a result their sources and volume of public 
funding. This hierarchy is used to approximate the quality of an institution. 
 
2.1 Proposed changes to the system 
 
The United Kingdom has a long tradition of a unique price for higher education with 
the government subsidising higher education institutions6. However, in order to keep 
higher education budget under control, per student funding has fallen continually as 
the number of students has increased. In particular, between 1989 and 1997 per 
student funding decreased by 36% (HMO, 2003). This prolonged lack of funding in 
higher education has lead to what is perceived as a funding crisis in the sector. 
Following extensive lobbying by some of the Russell Group universities, reforms 
have been proposed to allow universities the freedom to differentiate their fees by 
                                                 
4 See also Wolf (2002) chapter 6 for more evidence on the increasing gap in university attainment by 
social class. 
5 The members of the Russell Group are as follows: University of Birmingham, University of Bristol, 
University of Cambridge, Cardiff University, University of Edinburgh, University of Glasgow, 
University of Leeds, University of Liverpool, University of Manchester, University of Newcastle upon 
Tyne, University of Nottingham, University of Oxford, University of Sheffield, University of 
Southampton, University of Warwick, Imperial College, King's College London, London School of 
Economics and University College London. 
6 Prior to 1998, attendance at any higher education institution was free. In 1998, a means tested tuition 
fee was introduced in England and Wales irrespective of the institution attended or the subject studied. 
The current fee increases in line with inflation (£1,100 per annum). Students eligible for the tuition fee 
currently pay this cost up front and repay maintenance loans after graduation contingent on their 
income. See Appendix for detailed information on the current funding arrangements. 
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subject and encourage them to be more financially independent of central 
government 7. 
  
An entirely deregulated market has not been introduced. Tuition fees have been 
capped to a maximum £3,000 per annum and universities will only have the right to 
change differentiated fees if they sign an agreement with the newly formed access 
regulator to ensure that those individuals from non traditional university backgrounds 
are not discouraged from attending for financial reasons. These reforms appear to 
acknowledge that institutions are heterogeneous in the quality and cost of the teaching 
provided. 
 
3 ‘Teaching Quality’ and returns to Higher Education 
 
Despite the large increase in the proportion of a cohort graduating, there is no clear 
evidence that returns to degrees have fallen over time. Harkness and Machin (1999), 
using the General Household Survey between 1979 and 1995 and Walker and Zhu 
(2002), using Labour Force Survey throughout the 1990s, report no particular trend in 
the returns to a degree during the period. The authors’ estimates of the return to an 
undergraduate degree range between 14% to 23% for men and 16% to 26% for 
women8. These estimates are generally consistent with existing estimates of the 
returns to the number of years of schooling and the fact that returns are greater for 
women than for men. This would suggest that the demand shift in favour of the more 
educated has been at least as large as the supply shift in favour of tertiary education. 
These studies also provide evidence of heterogeneity in the returns to a degree by 
subject with Maths and Engineering leading to higher returns than average whilst the 
opposite is true for graduates from Humanities and Arts degrees. However, the issue 
of the quality of an institution on the earnings of graduates has largely been ignored. 
 
Most of the literature on the quality of education has focused on schools. Evidence 
concerning higher education is sparse and inconclusive. In the United Kingdom, 
Naylor et al. (2000) use administrative data on the population of individuals 
graduating from Old universities in 1994. Among this selective group of universities 
the authors find that mean weekly earnings range from £370 and £430 and conclude 
that, “universities explain only a small fraction in the differences in graduates’ 
earnings profiles”. The study has some important caveats: first, the selected 
institutions are more homogenous than the universe of higher education institutions in 
                                                 
7 The current reforms will also move the burden of payment to after graduation. Students will remain 
eligible for maintenance loans and grants. As before, the debt accumulated will be repaid following 
graduation though the tax system and will be income contingent. These changes to the timing of the 
payment of fees were proposed in order to mitigate the financial constraints of higher education for 
students from lower socio economic groups. 
8 These estimates are obtained by using individuals with A-levels as their highest qualification as a 
control group. Some studies have recently accounted for selection into university. Ermish and 
Francesconi (2000) rely on parental wealth and maternal education levels to estimate a selection 
equation into higher education. The selection term is always significant in a wage equation, but only 
marginally affects the estimated returns. Using the National Child Development Study (NCDS), 
Blundell et al (2001) follow a similar strategy, and rely on parental wealth, interest in the child’s 
education and the number of siblings as identifying variables of the selection equation. These variables 
are also used as instruments for the qualification decision. Additionally, they estimate the returns to 
education by propensity score matching. Unlike Instrumental Variables (IV) and selection controlled 
estimates, which are significantly higher than OLS estimates, matching results are not substantially 
different. The authors conclude that since IV and selection controlled estimates are larger than OLS, 
this suggests that OLS regression may compensate selection bias with measurement error.  
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the UK; second graduates are surveyed six months after leaving university and their 
earnings are imputed from the occupation occupied at that time, which may be a poor 
proxy for life-time earnings. Belfield and Fielding (2001) rely on the 1996 survey of 
graduates and investigate the relationship between universities’ input, in the form of 
student-staff ratios and subject adjusted resources, and students’ financial outcomes, 
but cannot find any quality effect. Their estimates could be biased since no correction 
for the selection of students into a specific university is included, apart from the 
control for A-level score. Their measures of quality focusing on students-staff ratio 
and unit resources may also be inappropriate if quality is only loosely related to these 
characteristics. 
On the other hand, evidence from the US of college quality effects is prevalent. 
Brewer et al. (1999) for example conclude that even correcting for selection into the 
type of university (using estimated net costs), prestigious private institutions provide 
significantly higher financial returns compared to low cost public institutions. These 
returns increase through time within and between cohorts (NLSY, High School and 
Beyond 1982) concomitantly with the fee differential. Whilst Daniel et al. (1997) 
confirm that fee differentials are in line with quality differentials, they criticise the 
parametric approach in the rest of the literature. Black and Smith (2002) therefore rely 
on propensity score matching to estimate the long run effect of institution quality on 
earnings. Attending a top quality university increases earnings by about 6% for men 
and 10% for women, however, their estimates are imprecise due to small sample 
sizes9. These results of the positive effect of institutional quality on earnings are 
contradicted by Berg, Dale and Krueger (2002). Using information on the university a 
graduate attended but also those the individual applied to, the authors claim to be able 
to control for selectivity on unobservables, as well as observables. In doing so, they 
find no financial return to attending a more selective institution. Results may also be 
sensitive to the measure of quality and the variety estimation strategy. Cross-country 
differences in the returns to university quality may also be due to the greater 
competition and heterogeneity between universities in the US than in the UK (Hoxby, 
1997). 
 
3.1 Modelling Strategy 
 
A simple model of the decision process of potential students has the following form.  
We assume that the quality of an institution affects the earnings of graduates but also 
the probability of graduation10. To extend Montmartquette et al. (2002), we assume 
that for an individual i, the choice of an institution j, is based on the expected 
probability of graduation (gij) and expected life time earnings (wij). We define A and 
X, as the determinants of respectively gij and wij. The quality of the institution j affects 
the probability of graduation and earnings upon graduation. Since tuition fees are 
equal in all institutions, individual i expected utility of graduation at an institution j is 
simply:  
 
 )( w))(1()( )()( i0 XAgXwAgUE ijijijij -+=    (1) 
 
                                                 
9 These estimates may be considered as a lower bound of the effect of graduating as individuals 
dropping out of university will in general have lower earnings than college graduates. 
10 The difference in the probability of graduation between institutions reflects variations in the subjects 
offered and threshold to pass the test. Light and Strayer (2000) for example shows that the probability 
of graduating is higher when observed ability and quality are matched. 
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where wi0 is the expected lifetime earning of i if dropping out of university. If the 
supply of places at each university were perfectly elastic, individual i, would choose 
to register at the university maximising the utility of graduation. For an individual 
with high ability and therefore a high probability of graduation, the choice will mostly 
be based on expected lifetime earnings; for a less able individual, the probability of 
graduation may be a more important determinant than the expected earnings. 
 
However, the United Kingdom educational system is centralised and prospective 
students are limited to applying to only six institutions. Offers are made by the first 
chosen institution and are conditional on achieving a specific A-level point score. The 
probability of acceptance to an institution (lij) is based on the individual 
characteristics but also on the characteristics of the other applicants at university j, say 
(Z).  Thus, for individual i, the utility of graduation at institution j becomes: 
 
)(  w),( ))(1(                  
)(  w) ),(1()( )( ),()(
i0
i0
XZAlAg
XZAlXwAgZAlUE
ijij
ijijijijij
-+
-+=
   (2) 
 
The second and third terms of the right hand side of (2) represent the earnings if not 
attending tertiary education and the earnings if dropping out of university 
(respectively). Since, only a limited number of applications are permitted, and 
individuals may have poor information on the characteristics of other applicants, risk 
aversion and strategic behaviour affect the mix of institutions applied to. These 
characteristics of the UK higher education sector create some disparities between the 
ability of individuals and the institution attended; hence the common support 
assumption required for out later estimating methods should be fulfilled. 
 
3.2  Econometric issues 
 
The simplest model to estimate the effect on wages of graduating from a particular 
type of institution is simply to rely on a log wage model (Mincer, 1974) and include 
dummies for the type of institution attended (Specification 1)11. Throughout this 
discussion, returns are estimated relative to an individual who graduated from a 
modern university.  
 
 iXiIii cXIW ebb +++=ln      (3) 
 
where for each individual i, ln(W) is the natural logarithm of gross wage, Xi is a vector 
of idiosyncratic characteristics affecting wages, I refers to the type of institution 
attended, c is a constant for all individuals and e is an error terms measuring the 
impact of the non-observable characteristics on the individual wage.  
 
Specification 1 would provide unbiased estimates of institution effects if the matching 
of candidates and institutions were random. As stated above, the sorting process is 
mostly based on the A-level scores of prospective students. Therefore, in specification 
2, we include the A-level score of the individual. If the matching of students and 
institutions were solely based on academic ability, then controlling for A-level in the 
wage regression, would lead to unbiased returns to the type of institution attended. To 
reflect the heterogeneity in the returns to a degree, we also control for degree class 
                                                 
11 Since we observed clusters of respondents by institution and institutions are of different size, the 
standard errors of ordinary least square have to be corrected (Moulton, 1987).  
 7 
and subject12 (specification 3). Finally, since prospective students can only apply to a 
limited number of institutions, some strategic behaviour may be at play. Depending 
on their risk aversion, expectations about A-level results and competition at a given 
institution, students may choose a different mix of institutions to apply to. In order to 
proxy some of the factors affecting the decision process, we include family 
background, as it may affect risk aversion and the type of schools attended 
(specification 4), since it may be the case that those attending fee paying schools and 
other types of secondary level selective institutions have less uncertainty regarding 
possible A-level scores. These variables would also be correlated with wages, thus, 
our final specification has the following form. 
 
iSiPiAiXiIii cSPAXIW ebbbbb ++++++=ln    (4) 
 
where for each individual i, A is the A-level score achieved and attempts to control for 
the prior ability of the individual, P is a vector of parental characteristics measured by 
parental social class and S is the type of school attended prior to university. 
 
The variables to be included in X impact on the estimates. If institutions affect wages 
directly but also through the sector of work, industry, region or some other observable 
characteristics that we may want to include in X, the inclusion of these characteristics 
would reduce our estimates of institutional effects. To capture the total effect of 
teaching quality on wages, X is restricted to the following covariates: post-graduate 
qualifications, a quadratic function of labour market experience since graduations, 
employer size, type of contract (permanent / temporary), self-employment status and 
current region of residence. 
 
Despite the richness of the dataset, a linear model may still fail to estimate unbiased 
returns to type of institution attended if the matching process between prospective 
students and the institution is based on either some non-observable characteristics, or 
a non- linear function of observable characteristics. A remaining difficulty could be 
the lack of common support so that institutional effects would not be identified 
without imposing a functional form.  
 
To explain this last point further, assume that selection is solely based on A-level 
score (good or average) and that there are only two types of institutions (prestigious, 
standard). Further, assume that there is no constraint on the number of places 
available to good students at prestigious institutions. In such a model, all good 
students would be observed in a prestigious institution and all other students would be 
in a standard institution. The institutional quality effect would then be perfectly 
correlated with ability and could not be identified. 
 
To relax the linearity assumption and to make the common support hypothesis 
explicit, we estimate institutional effects on wages by propensity score matching. In 
other words, we want to estimate the earning premium for attending a prestigious  
university compared to a Modern university (Average Treatment Effect on the 
Treated).  
 
                                                 
12 Datcher Loury and Garman (1995) shows that for white omitting major, degree grade and parental 
income bias upwards the positive effect of college selectivity on earnings by up to 50%. 
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The probability of graduating from a prestigious institution ( )(ˆ iXP ) is calculated for 
all individuals. In order to be able to match a treated individual at least one individual 
in the control population must have a “similar” propensity score: this is the common 
support assumption. As only matched treated individuals are used, it is crucial to 
check for common support, otherwise, the estimates would be biased13. Details on the 
matching procedure used in this paper are available in the Appendix. 
 
4 Data 
 
Our measure of quality is simply based on the type of institution attended and possible 
membership of the Russell group 14. This definition of quality encompasses all the 
aspects of the institutions that affect the quality of the teaching and the financial 
returns to their alumni. Therefore, unobservable characteristics such as network 
effects are also captured. We rely both on the 1985-1990 Graduate Cohort Studies 
(interviewed in 1996) and the 1995 Graduate Cohort Study (interviewed in 1998). 
Both surveys contain a representative selection of United Kingdom institutions, which 
volunteered to survey their alumni by postal survey. The 1985 and 1990 cohorts were 
both surveyed in 1996, i.e. 6 or 11 years after graduation while the 1995 cohort was 
surveyed 42 months after graduation. Alumni records may not be adequate for 
graduates that have left the institution up to 11 years previously, thus the data for the 
older cohorts may be affected by response bias15. The 1998 survey provides some 
details (DfES, 1999) on response rates, which vary from 16% to 46% by institution, 
with an average of 27%. Both surveys attempted to create a data set for about 5% of 
the graduate population but fell somehow short of this target. The raw sample sizes 
for the 3 cohorts of interest are: 5,835, 9,688 and 10,575 16.   
 
It should be noted at this stage that although the cohort studies are considered 
comparable, there are some discrepancies between the data sets which make direct 
comparisons difficult. In particular, there are differences in the sampling time frame. 
Therefore, it is impossible to separate a cohort effect from a ‘time since graduation’ 
effect. In addition, the information collected on respondents is not directly 
comparable between cohorts. For instance, information relating to the type of school 
attended is collected for the 1985 and 1990 cohorts but is not available for the 1995 
cohort. Also, ‘A’ Level score, parental occupation and subject of degree are not 
defined identically across the two surveys. The main discrepancy between the two 
surveys concerns the definition of earnings. While both surveys rely on categorical 
                                                 
13 In case of a lack of common support, the estimate becomes the Average Treatment Effect on the 
Matched Treated. Heckman et al, (1997) decompose the bias of a propensity score estimate into its 
three basic components: B1 is the biased that occurs due to lack of common support, B2 arises from 
different distributions of X within the two populations on the common support, and B3 is due to 
differences in outcomes that remain even after conditioning on observables and making comparisons 
on a region of common support (due to selection on the unobservables). The authors compare matching 
results with experimental data and show that the first two terms of the bias may be substantial. 
14 Heckman et al. (1996) suggest that estimates of the effect of quality of education are sensitive to the 
choice of quality measures and the level of aggregation of the data. Our measure of quality incorporates 
several dimensions that may or may not be correlated with observable characteristics of the institutions 
such as peer group or reputation effects. 
15 Additional details can be found in Belfield et al (1997, HEFCE research series) who suggest that the 
survey is broadly representatives of the original student populations 
16 The 1996 survey and the 1998 survey differ slightly in the institutions included in their target 
population, with the latter survey excluding Open University, a distance learning centre, but also some 
specialist colleges. To make the cohorts more compatible we exclude Open University graduates from 
the 1996 survey.  
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annual gross wage, it is possible to approximate hourly pay for the 1985/1990 cohorts 
but not for the 1995 cohort, as weekly hours worked are not recorded. 
 
We restrict the working sample to individuals who graduated with an undergraduate 
degree before the age of 25, who were in full time employment in the UK, provided 
information on earnings at the time of the survey and were not affected by heath 
problems limiting their day-to-day activity. These restrictions further reduce the 
sample size to 2,120, 3,497 and 6,210 observations respectively17. 
 
To support the assumption of heterogeneity in the population of students between the 
different types of institutions, Table 3 reports, the mean A-level score by cohort and 
institution type as well as the proportion of students with no (or missing) A-levels. 
The analysis is conducted separately by gender but since the conclusions are similar, 
we only comment on the results relating to women (Panel A). On these two measures 
the differences between types of institution are significant.  
 
Russell group universities attract more academically able graduates; for all cohorts the 
average A Level point score reaches 23 out of 30.  This is 40% and 50% greater than 
the average score recorded at Old and Modern universities respectively. The 
dispersion in the average score is lower for the 1995 cohort than previous cohorts, but 
this could be due to differences in the measurement of the variable. In particular, for 
the 1985 and 1990 cohort, the exact score was stated, but for the 1995 cohort only a 
categorical variable is available. The categorisation hides variations in the distribution 
of scores between institutions.  
 
There has been an increasing drive to widen participation in higher education through 
attracting individuals who might not be in possession of traditional university 
entrance requirements. Using the proportion of graduates without A-levels confirms 
the differences in the student population. Old and Modern graduates are respectively 2 
and 3 times more likely not to possess A-levels than graduates from Russell Group 
institutions. All institutions have been accepting more and more individuals with 
alternative qualifications (vocational) and by 1995, 21% of graduates attending a 
Modern university did not possess A-levels. Men are even more likely to graduate 
without A-levels, as nearly a third of Modern university graduates did not report 
having this entrance qualification. 
 
In addition, we also report the distribution of A-level point scores by university type18 
(Table 4). In 1985, a quarter of the graduates from “prestigious” institutions belonged 
to the top quartile of the ability distribution. This proportion at Modern universities 
was only 3.5%. Inversely, less than 10% of “prestigious” students originated from the 
bottom of the A-level score distribution whilst 60% did so at polytechnics. This 
confirms that students from the different types of institutions are heterogeneous in 
their ability. This is not surprising since most of the selection process is based on 
academic ability. However, Table 4 also highlights that this selection is not perfect 
since all institutions have accepted students from each quartile of the A-level 
distribution. This provides the first evidence that common support may exist when 
estimating the effect of graduating from a Russell group institution rather than a 
Modern university.  Black and Smith (2002) find some evidence of asymmetric 
                                                 
17 The important selection of the sample is due to limiting the population to first degree holders; in the 
1996 survey, this restriction eliminates 40% of the surveyed population.  
18 Individuals with no A-level were recoded as 0. 
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sorting with more able students more likely to be in institutions of lower quality than 
low ability students in “prestigious” institutions. We do not find such asymmetry 
despite the fact our sample is more selective (university graduatesrather than those 
who simply attended university, which, assuming that individuals with lower ability 
are more likely to drop out of university should lead to greater asymmetry). 
 
Table 5 provides evidence on the earning differential of graduates by type of 
institution attended. Gross wages are inflated to 2002 prices using the Retail Price 
Index. For the first two cohorts, we reproduce annual and hourly wage, whilst for the 
1995 only the former is reported. Since, all cohorts are surveyed at a different point 
after graduation, cross cohort comparisons are difficult to interpret.  
 
Graduates from Russell group institutions earn more than those from Modern 
universities at all points in the income distribution. At the mean, the hourly and 
annual earnings premium associated with attending a Russell group or an Old 
university are substantially greater than those associated with attendance at a Modern 
University. For example, for women graduating in 1985, the average wage following 
graduation from a Russell group institution is £14.80 (hourly) or £32,686 (annual), 
which is equivalent to a premium of 19% over graduates from a polytechnic 19.  
 
The premium for attending a “prestigious” institution is of similar magnitude for both 
genders, around 17% in 1985, 11% in 1990 and between 6% and 9% for the 1995 
cohort. The decrease of the premium between cohorts may indicate that the premium 
for attending a prestigious institution increases with time on the labour market or that 
the quality gap between institutions has narrowed through time. We will try to 
differentiate between these two hypotheses in the results section. 
 
The evidence relating to whether there is a premium for attending an Old university is 
tenuous. At most the difference between graduates from Old and Modern universities 
reaches 6% for 1995 female graduates, and in a couple of cases these graduates earn 
less than individuals educated in a Modern university. Graduation from institution 
categorised as “other” consistently lead to lower earnings but this may be due to the 
specificity of the degree provided (Teaching qualifications) rather than a quality issue. 
Additionally, the type of institution does not affect the size of the gender wage gap; 
for all cohorts and institutions, the gender wage gap is approximately 15%. 
 
This preliminary analysis of the data confirms that attending a “prestigious” 
institution is correlated with higher earnings but also that students at the different 
types of institutions are heterogeneous. Importantly for our estimation strategy, the 
matching of students’ ability to university type is not perfect, so a common support 
should be found. 
 
5  Institutional effects on wages 
 
5.1  Linear selection 
 
First we estimate the model presented in (4). We establish the importance of 
controlling for pre-university ability (specification 2), subject of graduation and 
                                                 
19 Since the wage premium for graduating from a prestigious institution is similar for hourly and annual 
wage, the number of hours worked is not dependent on the type of university attended, at least for this 
selected group of full-time workers.  
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grades (specification 3) and parental background (specification 4) compared to a 
simple Mincer specification with dummies for university type (specification 1). The 
estimated returns to a degree relative to graduating from a Modern institution are 
reported separately by cohort and gender in Table 6. 
 
Graduating from a Russell group institution always leads to a wage gain compared to 
attending a Modern university. In the base specification, this gap ranges from 6 to 
16% for women and 9% to 12% for men. The premium for graduating from an Old 
university is between 0% and 8%, significant only for the most recent cohort. 
Graduates from “other” institutions fair even less well in the labour market. Results 
for women are likely to be biased by selection effects, and this selection increases as 
women ages, thus for cross cohort comparison we focus on men. In this base 
specification the evolution through time does not reveal major changes in the effect of 
university quality on graduate wages.  
 
Controlling for pre-university educational achievement (specification 2) reduces the 
quality premium which becomes insignificant for the 1985 and 1990 cohorts. For the 
1995 cohort, adding controls for A-level score reduces the premium associated with 
attending a Russell group by about 25%. Females from the 1985 cohort are an 
exception to this rule; the coefficient associated with attend ing a Russell group 
university falls only from 16% to 14% with the inclusion of A-level scores. For Old 
university graduates, the inclusion of academic ability does not have such a 
substantial effect which highlights the fact that the selection into those universities is 
not dissimilar to the process conducted in Modern universities. 
 
Adding further controls for subject choice, class of degree achieved and parental 
background does not substantially affect the estimated quality effects. These results 
confirm that the selection process is principally based on A-level score. For graduates 
from “other” institutions, controlling for subject of degree substantially affects their 
performance compared to graduates from Modern universities. In the simplest model, 
graduates from institutions classified as “other” appear to benefit less financially from 
their investment (-6% for women, -10% for men) compared to Modern university 
attendance. Adding controls for A-levels does not change these conclusions since, as 
seen in Table 2, the average A Level point score at both types of institutions are 
similar. However, after controlling for the subject of degree, the financial return to 
graduating from these institutions is in most cases not substantially different from the 
return obtained by graduates from Modern universities. 
 
The conclusion of this analysis is that the differences in the returns to a university 
degree by type of institution attended are, after controlling for ability, subject and 
family background, less severe than have been claimed elsewhere. In the preferred 
specification, graduating from a prestigious institution leads to a wage premium 
ranging between 2% and 17%. Generally, estimates of the returns to the quality or 
type of HE institution that do no account for pre-university academic ability will lead 
to results that are heavily biased. Apart from the 1995 cohort, we do not find any 
quality differences between graduates from Old and Modern universities. These 
estimates are still biased if there is no common support or the relationship between the 
observables and earnings does not follow the functional form imposed. 
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5.2 Propensity score matching  
 
To implement propensity score matching the Conditional Independence Assumption 
is assumed. The institutional characteristics of the UK application process, makes the 
claim that selection to a prestigious institution is based on observables plausible 
Descriptive statistics confirm that the sorting of prospective students to a specific 
institution is predominant ly based on A-level score. Whilst it is crucial that sorting is 
based on observed characteristics, it is also important that no observed characteristics 
completely predict access to the treatment group (attendance at a prestigious  
institution). If sorting on A-levels results was a perfect predictor of the type of 
university attended, there would be no common support between individuals from 
different type of institutions and no individual could be paired with an individual (or 
individuals) from another type of institution. 
 
To estimate the propensity score we use a specification including A-level score, 
ethnicity and paternal socio-economic group. The 1985 and 1990 cohorts’ 
specification also includes dummies for paternal education, home ownership and type 
of schools attended, whilst for the 1995 cohort, we add information whether the 
individual made use of their college career service (more than 4 times) prior to 
registering at university. These variables attempt to capture academic and financial 
constraints as well as motivation. All variables are interacted with A-level score. We 
consider two treatments, attending a Russell group university or an Old university 
while the control group is composed of graduates from Modern universities20. 
 
The distributions of propensity scores associated with attendance at a Russell group 
rather than a Modern university are reported for each cohort and gender in Figure 1. 
Each bin has a width of 0.05; with the exception of the top bin in the 1995 cohort of 
men, there is evidence of common support, since for each bin with at least one treated 
observation there is at least one control observation. This common support is 
nevertheless rather thin in some cases. The small numbers of available control 
observations constrains the choice of procedure to matching with replacement. The 
distributions of propensity scores are remarkably similar by gender. With the 
expansion of higher education, the selection model becomes less “extreme”. For the 
1985 cohort, more than 50% of the Russell Group graduates are estimated to have a 
probability of attending such an institution greater than 95%; this proportion is around 
30% for the 1990 cohort and almost nil for the 1995 cohort21.  
 
This indicates that Russell group universities have ‘lowered’ their admission 
standards. The competition for new students also affected the quality of the recruits in 
Modern universities. Whilst for the 1985 cohort, the distribution of propensity scores 
is rather uniform, indicating that students of all abilities attended Modern universities, 
by 1990, about 30% of graduates from former polytechnics possessed a propensity 
score of attending a prestigious university inferior to 0.05. In other words the 
competition for students has become more intense. Russell group institutions have 
effectively poached the most talented pupils away from Modern universities and the 
growth in the Modern university sector was made possible by attracting students of 
predominantly lower ability. For example, in 1985, 41% of females in polytechnics 
                                                 
20 We do not provide matched estimates of the effect of attending an institution classified as “other”, as 
the sample is too small. 
21 It has to be noted that the distribution of the 1995 cohort is affected by the fact that A-level score was 
reported in a categorical format rather than in a continuous form. Thus, we observed clusters of 
propensity scores rather than a distribution. 
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had a propensity of attending a prestigious university lower than 10%. By 1990, this 
proportion is 57%. The increased competition for students may have had opposite 
consequences on the relative returns to attending a “prestigious” institution. If Russell 
Group institutions have lowered their admission standards to a greater extent than 
modern institution, then the returns to attending a “prestigious” institution should 
have fallen. If polytechnics have replaced their poached students with students of 
lower ability, the returns to attending a Russell Group university may have increased 
 
Various matched estimates of institutional effects are reported in Table 7. We also 
include two indicators of the match quality. First, the proportion of treated 
observations that are successfully matched (with nearest neighbour) and, as an 
indicator of the thinness of the common support, we also include the number of 
control observations accounting for 50% of the matches. This indicates how sensitive 
our estimates are to the few observations guaranteeing common support. Nearest 
neighbour matches are reported with a calliper of 0.1 and 0.01. Similarly, kernel 
estimates use a bandwidth of 0.1 and 0.01. Additionally, to test the linearity 
assumption, we report OLS results based on the sample of matched pairs with the 
tightest calliper.  
 
As with the OLS estimates, female graduates from the 1985 cohort enjoy high and 
stable returns (+16%) above those graduating from Modern universities, however, 
these estimates are biased due to selection effects For the other cohorts, the estimated 
effects of graduating from a prestigious institution are much smaller, usually 
insignificant and far less stable. For all estimates, the common support assumption is 
validated with the larger calliper and even the tighter calliper leads to match rates 
above 95%. Therefore, we can be confident, that our estimates are not biased by lack 
of common support. More worryingly however is that the common support is rather 
thin, with a handful of control observations being responsible for 50% of the 
matches22. The relative instability and imprecision of our estimates is a direct 
consequence of this thin support.  
  
Focusing on estimates using Epanechnikov kernel with the tightest bandwidth, 
attending a prestigious institution leads to a pay premium ranging from 2.5% to 3.7% 
for women from the 1990 and 1995 cohorts.. Focusing on men, the estimates differ 
widely by cohort, from 0% in 1985, 4.5% in 1990 and 5.8% in 1995. For all matching 
procedures, the returns to quality are larger for the younger cohort. While it is 
impossible to differentiate between a time and a cohort effect, the trend is consistent 
with an increase in the heterogeneity of the students between institution types, as also 
observed in the US during a period of increasing participation to higher education.  
 
Quality differs widely in the higher education system in the UK with graduates from 
the most prestigious universities enjoying substantial pay premium over graduates 
from Modern institutions. This premium is not precisely estimated due to the thinness 
of the common support. To test the robustness of these results, we added a normal 
random error term to the propensity score. While changing the matched pairs and the 
common support, estimates based on the modified propensity score were similar to 
those presented. Thus, the thinnest of the common support does not seem to lead to 
biased results. 
                                                 
22 Black and Smith (2002) report the distribution of matches and similarly a handful of control 
observations account for 50% of matches. We are not aware of other studies reporting this measure of 
the quality of the match. 
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For each cohort, the last line of Table 7 reports the OLS estimate based on the 
matched population rather than the full population. The estimates on the selected 
population are different from those obtained on the full sample, indicating that the 
original results were affected by the lack of common support. In a number of cases, 
the matched OLS estimates are out of line with propensity score matching estimates, 
which indicates that the assumption of linear selection on the observables should be 
rejected. Previous studies relying on OLS estimating methods may therefore be 
seriously biased.  
 
Similarly, we estimate the effect of graduating from an Old university as opposed to a 
Modern university. The distribution of propensity score is reported in Figure 2. As 
with attending a Russell Group university, we find that with time, the distribution of 
scores for graduates at Old universities has shifted to the left and looks almost 
uniform for the 1990 cohort. The distribution for individuals attending a Modern 
university also shifted to the left, so that the common support assumption is not 
supported for a few bins.  
 
Neverthe less, Table 8 shows that for all groups, more than 90% of the treated 
individuals are matched. The common support is almost universal but is rather thin. 
For most groups, nearest neighbour estimates are lower than kernel based estimates, 
but within a matching estimator type, the choice of calliper/bandwidth does not 
significantly alter the estimates. As a consequence of the thin support, the estimates 
are rather imprecise. As with Russell group institutions, there is no quality premium 
for older workers and the trends are similar to those previously described. Focusing 
on kernel match with the tightest bandwidth, there is no clear evidence that graduating 
from an Old university rather than a Modern university leads to a financial premium 
and two estimates are even negative. The largest estimates are obtained for the most 
recent cohort (+4% for women and +2% for men), which is consistent with an 
improvement in the relative quality of the population of graduates from Old 
universities. Since, we do not find positive effects of attending an Old university, the 
remaining of the paper focuses on Russell Group institutions solely. 
 
5.3 Who benefits from attending a “prestigious” institution? 
 
The effect of attending a prestigious institution may be heterogeneous. First, Russell 
group institutions may vary in quality, this assumption is tested by focusing on two 
large prestigious universities. The second source of heterogeneity is between students 
at an institution. The wage gains from attending a prestigious institution may be 
distributed unevenly between graduates. Does the higher quality of teaching provided 
benefit students with the highest ability within an institution? Similarly, if we believe 
that part of the wage premium from attending a prestigious university stems from a 
network effect then it may be the case that graduates from higher social class reap the 
benefit while graduates from lower social classes do not benefit as much from the 
“old boy network”.  
 
While the previous results reveal differences between university types, they may hide 
variations in quality within type. To check this, we isolate two Russell Group 
institutions for which we have more than 500 observations (grouping the 1985 and 
1990 cohorts). For these two institutions, we match graduates following the same 
procedure as the one presented above with the exception that the propensity score 
regression also includes cohort and gender dummies as well as their interaction with 
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A level scores. The common support assumption is easily satisfied as the graduates 
from both institutions have similar characteristics and only 3 graduates from the better 
institution (say A)23 are not matched. In addition, 96 control observations are 
responsible for 50 % of the matches, with a control observation being used at most in 
8 times. Contrary to the generic results, the common support in this case is rather 
thick. Graduates from institution A earn between 7.5% and 8.5% more than those 
from the control institution. These estimates are precisely estimated. OLS estimates 
on the matched population are about 20% lower than nearest neighbour estimate. 
While the rest of the discussion carries on focusing on differences between institution 
types, it is worth remembering that differences in quality within institution group (at 
least for the prestigious group) are also marked 
We focus on two observable characteristics of graduates; their ability prior to 
attending university and their socio-economic background to test the heterogeneity of 
quality effects among graduates. If the effect on earnings of teaching quality is 
correlated with ability, this will be informative on how the extra resources are 
allocated: is the higher quality of teaching focused on a few prestigious  students 
within these prestigious institutions or on the contrary, are the extra resources targeted 
towards the weaker students? Similarly, the quality effect on earnings may just be due 
to a reputation or a network effect. As graduates from higher social class may be more 
able to exploit the network, we test this hypothesis by comparing the pay premium of 
attending a prestigious institution for high and low socio economic background 
graduates. 
 
For each individual, we compute the effect of the treatment as the difference between 
the observed and the control wages (Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth of 0.01). 
While there are variations in the income effect associated with attending a Russell 
Group institution, the effect is neither correlated with ability nor family background. 
Figure 3 for example plots A-level score and individual treatment effects for females 
from the 1985 cohort. These results are similar when tested in a parametric set-up24 or 
for other cohorts. As no significant correlation between family background and the 
quality effect is found, we conclude that prestigious  institutions provide better quality 
teaching and that the positive effect of attending them is not solely due to a network 
effect. Since previous ability has no impact on the quality effect, it seems that 
prestigious universities allocate their extra resources evenly between their graduates 
and do not solely focus on a few prominent students.  
 
In other words, while Russell Group institutions are rather unequal in their current 
access arrangements, with more able pupils from better socio-economic background 
being over-represented. The positive earning effect of attending a prestigious  
institution is independent of the student’s characteristics so these institutions appear to 
level the playing field within their intake. The effect of institution on earnings stems 
from differences in the quality of the teaching rather than solely on network effect. 
This may explain why heterogeneity between institutions is large. Comparing two 
Russell group universities, graduates from the most prestigious earn 6% more than the 
others. 
 
 
                                                 
23 Institutions can be identified but not named.  
24 Ordinary least square of the determinants of treatment effects were estimated separately for each 
cohort and gender. The specification was similar to the one used for estimating wages. The coefficients 
on A-level score and paternal occupation were not found significant. 
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5.4  Wage growth effects 
 
The premium for attending a prestigious institution may have various origins. 
Theoretically, three explanations can be advanced. Better educational quality 
improves the human capital of students, hence at each period of their life, graduates 
from more prestigious universities earn more than others, however, the human capital 
model should not be associated with differences in the earning growth of the two 
types of graduates. The other two hypotheses have conflicting predictions regarding 
relative wage growth of graduates from prestigious universities. In a signalling model, 
the prestige of an institution may be used by employers to differentiate between new 
graduates when hiring. With time, the true ability of individuals will be revealed and 
the value of the signal will tend to zero. In such a world, the premium for attending a 
prestigious  institution diminishes over time in the labour market and graduates from 
different types of institution should achieve similar wage growth. An alternative 
hypothesis is that if part of the returns to attending a prestigious institution consists in 
peer group effects, one may expect the returns to the peer group to increase with time 
on the labour market. In an “old boy network” world, the wage growth of Russell 
Group graduates should be higher than the one expected by graduates from Modern 
universities. Thus, looking at wage growth allows us to conjecture on the origin of the 
pay gap between graduates from different types of institutions.  
 
The 1996 survey of graduates reports annual earnings one, six and, for the 1985 
cohort of graduates, 11 years after graduation. For individuals with positive earnings 
in both periods, we calculate wage growth25. The earning profile of UK graduates is 
steep, with a mean growth ranging from 60% to 100% for the period between the first 
and sixth year following graduation26. Confirming the human capital model, wage 
growth decreases with labour market experience and is reduced by about half for the 
second period (6 to 11 years after graduation). Individuals graduating from prestigious  
institutions have higher earnings growth but for most groups the differences are not 
significant. The institutional gap is larger for the younger cohort; indicating that for 
the younger cohort, the populations graduating from Russell and Modern universities 
are less substitutable than they were for the 1985 cohort. Gender differences in 
earning growth are limited, which is largely due to the selectivity of our sample. 
 
Individuals are matched on the propensity of graduating from a Russell Group 
institution following the same specification as the one detailed in the section on 
earnings effects. In Table 9, estimates obtained by propensity score matching using 
nearest neighbour and a calliper of 0.1 and using Epanechnikov kernel with a 
bandwidth of 0.1, are presented separately by sex, cohort and time period. For most 
groups, kernel matching produces more precisely defined estimates, so we concentrate 
the discussion on this set of results. The precision of the estimates is affected by the 
thinness of the common support. 
 
Female graduates from Russell Group universities enjoy substantially higher earning 
growth compared with their peers who graduated from a Modern university (15 
                                                 
25 The earnings variables are categorical, and mid-points are used to calculate earning growth which 
leads to mis -measurement of the true earning growth. Individuals reporting earnings in the same bin at 
two points are estimated to have experienced negative growth due to the deflation of the mid -point 
value over-time. However, only 1% of the individuals remain in the same earning category between 
1986 and 1991, and 3% between 1991 and 1996. 
26 These estimates of wage growth are affected by selection, since only individuals reporting earnings 
in the two periods are selected. 
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percentage points over the period between the first and sixth years for the 1990 
cohort). For the 1985 cohort, the growth gap decreases over time but remains 
substantial and significant. Results for women may be severely biased by selection in 
the labour market. Focusing on men, the estimates bounce depending on the matching 
procedure used. In most cases, no effect of quality on wage growth is found. It seems 
that the human capital of graduates is permanently increased by attending a 
prestigious institution.  
 
6 Fee differentials 
 
Armed with the evidence that for some groups, graduating from a more selective 
institution leads to higher earnings and potentially higher wage growth, we now 
crudely estimate under simplistic assumptions the tuition fee that a representative 
individual entering a Russell Group institution would be willing to pay over and 
above those charged at a Modern university in order to capture this earnings 
differential. First, using the Labour Force Survey, we estimate an age earnings profile 
of university graduates compared to those in possession of GCE A levels as their 
highest qualification and adjust earnings according to the premium associated with 
Russell Group attendance estimated in the previous section27. We also assume that the 
likelihood of employment is the same for all graduates, irrespective of the institution 
attended. Based on a real earnings growth rate of 2.0% and a real discount rate of 
3.5% (both HM Treasury current official figures) and the current tax allowance and 
rates, we calculate the difference in the net present value of the lifetime earnings of 
graduates from Modern and Russell Group universities.  
 
We build four scenarios; in the first two, graduates from Russell Group universities 
enjoy a premium over other graduates in every period of their working lives (assumed 
to be between age 21 and 60). This premium is fixed at 2% in scenario 1 and 5% in 
the scenario 2. Scenarios 3 and 4 are based on the opposite hypotheses that the 
premium respectively increases and decreases though time. Scenario 3 is consistent 
with a network effect, where Russell group graduates earnings growth increases 
though time, while scenario 4 is in line with a signalling model, where as the 
employers discover the true ability of graduates, the signal attached with graduating 
from a Russell Group university diminishes over time.  
 
We calculate the difference in the net present value of attending a Russell Group 
University and a Modern University under the various scenarios. Assuming that a 
degree takes three years to complete, we convert these net present values to a measure 
of ‘willingness to pay’. In other words, we estimate what a representative individual 
graduating from a Russell Group University would be prepared to pay in tuition fees 
per annum over and above that fee which might be paid by an individual attending a 
Modern university. The results are presented in Table 10.  
 
Our calculations of the annual fee differential range from £2,950 to £7,250 under 
these various scenarios. Since no strong support for quality effect on wage growth 
was found, scenario 1 and 2 may reflect evolution of graduate wages more 
appropriately. The UK government is currently planning to allow all universities to 
charge fees up to £3,000 per annum. So if we believe that the market for higher 
                                                 
27 As the Labour Force Survey includes graduates  from various type of institution, the mean graduate 
premium estimated is an upward value of the returns to graduating from a polytechnic, which would 
bias our estimates of the fee differential upwards. 
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education can reach an equilibrium, Russell Group universities should set their fees at 
this new maximum, while less prestigious institution may be tempted by reducing 
their fees (currently set at £1,100) in order to attract more students. Our estimates of 
fee differentials do not appear to be out of line with such a scenario. In order to 
capture a life-time earning premium, graduates from prestigious universities should be 
ready to pay tuition fees of ranging from £3,000 to £7,000 per annum more than the 
fees charged by Modern universities. Even allowing fees to increase to £3,000 will 
under most scenarios, mean that students do not fully pay for the financial premium 
associated with graduating from a more prestigious institution. Students attending 
prestigious institutions are therefore more subsidised than their peers graduating from 
less prestigious universities. 
 
In the US, where a linear relationship between tuition and quality is more likely to 
exist (Daniel et al., 1997), annual tuition and required fees at the 25th and 75th 
percentiles for the academic year 2000/2001 were respectively $2,594 and $4,094 in 
the public sector and $11,550 and $19,400 in private institutions 28. The inter-quartile 
range is therefore (in 2002 pounds) £1,000 in the public sector and £5,000 for private 
institutions. Despite the simplistic assumptions used to construct our estimates of fee 
different ials between institution types, it appears that our calculations are also in line 
with US evidence, where the providers of higher education are free to set their price29.  
 
Finally, despite the unique price charged in higher education, institutions have some 
freedom to allocate their budget. Comparing cost differential and return differentials 
is informative of the relative efficiency of the different types of institutions 30. Only 
institutions with more than 1,000 undergraduate students are used for the calculations 
of the median academic expenditures per student. Russell group institutions spend 
£4,000 more on their academic expenditure per student compared to Modern 
universities. This may be seen as the cost of providing higher quality teaching to their 
undergraduates compared to Modern universities. Assuming a permanent effect of 
university quality on wages, the extra teaching cost can be recouped if a wage 
premium of 2.8% is obtained by their graduates. A larger premium will indicate that 
Russell group institutions are more efficient providers of higher education. Since our 
matching estimates of the quality effect are imprecise, we cannot make any firm 
conclusion regarding the relative efficiency of the institutions. 
 
7 Conclusions  
 
This paper attempts to inform the debate on higher education tuition fees in the UK. 
This debate was initiated by the most prestigious institutions claiming that since they 
provide a service of higher quality teaching to their graduates, as measured by their 
earnings and the cost of provision, they should be allowed to charge higher tuition 
fees. This claim of heterogeneity in the returns to higher education by type of 
institution is nevertheless controversial as the intake of the various institutions is 
dissimilar.  
                                                 
28 Fees were obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics website. For public institution 
no break down by in or out of state residency status was available. 
29 Contrary to Daniel et al (1997), Sweetman (1995) find that despite the freedom to set tuition fees, the 
premium for attending a prestigious college is larger than the fee differential. 
30 Differences in academic expenditures are a crude measure of the relative efficiency of the different 
institutions. First, considering the institutional set-up, it is unclear how these differences originate.  
Second, expenditures on academic department are only one component of the quality of the teaching at 
a given institution. 
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The matching of students to an institution’s quality is largely put not perfectly due to 
academic ability. This imperfect sorting may be due to some institutional features and 
provides an estimation strategy: students at prestigious institutions can be paired with 
“similar” students in less prestigious universities. This strategy assumes that selection 
into the different types of university is based on observable characteristics, mostly 
academic achievements, but does not impose a functional form for the relationship 
between these observables and the choice of an institution. In fact, our results based 
on three cohorts of UK graduates point out that estimates based on ordinary least 
square could be substantially biased due to the linearity constraint.  
 
Propensity score matching estimates are affected by the thinness of the common 
support and tend to be imprecise. After controlling for academic achievement, subject 
of degree and family background, the quality claim has been largely over-stated. 
Attending a Russell Group institution (compared to a Modern university) leads to an 
earning premium ranging from 0 to 6% for men. Estimates for women are biased by 
selection effects. For the younger cohort, however, a premium of 2.5% is estimated.  
 
The financial benefit of attending a Russell Group university is homogenous, and is 
neither dependent on previous academic achievement nor parental background. In 
some sense, these universities level the playing field for their graduates. However, 
heterogeneity between prestigious  institutions is large. We find that the increase in 
earnings derived by graduates from prestigious universities stems from an increase in 
human capital rather than signalling or network effect, as it appears to be constant 
over time. 
 
Finally, we use these estimates of the returns to the type of institution attended to 
predict prices in the higher education market if institutions were left with the freedom 
to set their tuition fees. Under various scenarios, we estimate a fee differential 
between Russell Group and Modern universities ranging from £3,000 to £7,000. This 
range of tuition fees is in line with the current inter-quartile range observed in the US 
among private institutions. A tuition fee differential of £4,000 is also in line with 
measures of the differences in academic expenditures between the two types of 
institutions. These results suggest that by implementing a unique price of higher 
education (the current practice), the government subsidises graduates attending more 
prestigious institutions more generously than others and that as such there is some 
justification in the claim that institutions should be allowed greater freedom in setting 
their tuition fees.  
 
However, introducing price competition will drastically affect higher education in the 
UK. As mentioned in the current White Paper (HMO, 2003), with the introduction of 
fee differentials, students are going to become more exigent customers. Thus while 
average quality is likely to increase, the heterogeneity between institut ions may also 
augment with some institutions deciding to compete on lower price and others on 
higher quality (and the associated perceptions). The choice of subject provided by 
universities may also be affected with less popular courses being dropped out in 
favour of high revenue courses. Hoxby (1997) demonstrates that these market 
mechanisms took place in the US and are responsible for higher average quality, a 
homogenisation of the students within institutions and a greater variation in the 
quality of the degree provided between institutions. This is already happening in the 
UK. A negative consequence of the increased competition between providers of 
tertiary education is therefore to make the signal attached to a degree fuzzier or less 
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precise to employers. Hoxby and Terry (1999) note that variations in the returns to 
college education have significantly increased in the US as the education systems 
became more market oriented. The authors also show that the increasing matching of 
students’ ability to college quality is responsible for 40% of the explained growth in 
the dispersion of returns to higher education. A policy of liberalising prices of higher 
education in the UK may end up having similar effects. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of propensity scores between Russell Group and Modern 
Universities. 
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 Figure 2: Distribution of propensity score between Old and Modern Universities. 
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Figure 3: A-level score and wage premium of attending a Russell Group University over a 
Modern University: Women, Cohort 1985 
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Note: Wage differential estimated by propensity score matching (Epanechnikov, bandwidth=0.01) 
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Table 1: Age Participation Index by Social Class 
(Entrants who are GB domiciled, full-time, undergraduates aged less than 
21 as a proportion of the average of 18 and 19 year old population) 
 
  1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Overall API 1.8 3.4 5.4 8.4 12.4 19.3 33.4 
Top 3 social classes 8.4 18.5 26.7 32.4 33.1 36.7 47.8 
Bottom 3 social classes 1.5 2.7 3.6 5.1 6.5 10.3 18.2 
         
Social Class Gap 6.6 15.8 23.1 27.3 26.6 26.4 29.6 
Source: HMO, Department for Education and Skills, 2003 
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Table 2: Distribution of A-levels scores by Institution Type  
 
Panel A: Women 
 
 Russell Group Universities 
Old 
Universities 
Modern 
Universities 
Other 
Institutions  
     
1985 Cohort     
No A-levels 0.017 0.040 0.063 0 
Mean A-level score 
(out of 30) 
22.87 
(5.48) 
16.47 
(6.20) 
14.10 
(6.45) 
12.57 
(6.99) 
Observations 531 149 143 28 
     
1990 Cohort     
No A-level 0.020 0.041 0.069 0.030 
Mean A-level score 
(out of 30) 
23.08 
(4.88) 
17.92 
(6.07) 
13.98 
(5.76) 
11.85 
(6.67) 
Observations 681 197 766 132 
     
1995 Cohort     
No A-level 0.060 0.078 0.211 0.072 
Mean A-level score 
(out of 30) 
23.13 
(3.95) 
22.47 
(4.13) 
18.05 
(4.11) 
17.57 
(4.43) 
Observations 757 1083 1263 426 
 
Panel B: Men 
 
 Russell Group 
Universities 
Old 
Universities 
Modern 
Universities 
Other 
Institutions  
     
1985 Cohort     
No A-level 
 0.024 0.071 0.079 0.091 
Mean A-level score 
(out of 30) 
23.59 
(5.14) 
17.83 
(6.22) 
14.00 
(6.34) 
20.20 
(9.88) 
Observations 883 237 127 22 
     
1990 Cohort     
No A-level 0.016 0.118 0.149 0.079 
Mean A-level score 
(out of 30) 
24.32 
(4.80) 
19.97 
(5.84) 
14.21 
(6.10) 
14.14 
(7.81) 
Observations 663 220 752 76 
     
1995 Cohort     
No A-level 0.069 0.080 0.303 0.098 
Mean A-level score 
(out of 30) 
22.71 
(4.29) 
22.84 
(4.04) 
17.00 
(3.84) 
17.44 
(3.94) 
Observations 515 902 1143 121 
Note: 1995 cohort A level results are reported in a categorical variable, we used category mid-points. The 
mean A-level is based on individuals with a positive score. 
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Table 3: Bivariate distribution of ability by Institution Type  
 
Panel A: Women 
 
 Russell Group Universities 
Old 
Universities 
Modern 
Universities 
Other 
Institutions  
1985 Cohort     
Quartile 1 9.42 44.97 59.44 67.86 
Quartile 2 25.61 30.87 26.57 17.86 
Quartile 3 39.74 19.46 10.49 14.29 
Quartile 4 25.24 4.70 3.50 - 
Observations 531 149 143 28 
     
1990 Cohort     
Quartile 1 4.99 25.89 51.31 68.94 
Quartile 2 15.27 32.99 32.77 17.42 
Quartile 3 41.41 29.44 10.97 6.82 
Quartile 4 38.33 11.68 4.96 6.82 
Observations 681 197 766 132 
     
1995 Cohort     
Quartile 1 6.01 7.80 21.11 7.24 
Quartile 2 4.24 6.93 34.73 51.12 
Quartile 3 44.15 46.78 36.34 30.45 
Quartile 4 45.60 38.49 7.82 11.19 
Observations 757 1083 1263 426 
 
Panel B: Men 
 
 Russell Group Universities 
Old 
Universities 
Modern 
Universities 
Other 
Institutions  
     
1985 Cohort     
Quartile 1 12.91 45.99 74.02 36.36 
Quartile 2 29.67 35.02 17.32 9.09 
Quartile 3 27.63 10.97 4.72 22.73 
Quartile 4 29.78 8.02 3.94 31.82 
Observations 883 237 127 22 
1990 Cohort     
Quartile 1 3.47 23.18 54.39 61.84 
Quartile 2 12.22 27.73 26.73 14.47 
Quartile 3 34.99 30.00 14.76 10.53 
Quartile 4 49.32 19.09 4.12 13.116 
Observations 663 220 752 76 
1995 Cohort     
Quartile 1 6.92 8.02 30.31 9.80 
Quartile 2 8.08 5.36 39.96 46.16 
Quartile 3 41.94 44.68 25.36 37.36 
Quartile 4 43.06 41.94 4.37 6.68 
Observations 515 902 1143 121 
Note: 1995 cohort A level results are reported in a categorical variable, which are used rather than 
quartile. Individuals with no A-levels are coded as having a score of 0 
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Table 4: Distribution of hourly and annual pay (in 2002 price) by institution type  
Panel A: 
Women 
Russell Group 
Universities  
Old Universities  Modern 
Universities  
Other 
Institutions  
1985 Cohort Hourly 
pay 
Annual 
wage 
Hourly 
pay 
Annual 
wage 
Hourly 
pay 
Annual 
wage 
Hourly 
pay 
Annual 
wage 
10th percentile 9.13 19,002 7.66 15,547 7.31 15,547 5.98 15,547 
50th percentile 13.53 28,215 11.90 24,760 11.90 24,760 9.87 23,320 
90th percentile 22.15 51,823 18.76 43,186 18.46 38,580 18.08 43,186 
Mean 14.80 
(5.67) 
32,686 
(13,616) 
12.73 
(5.60) 
27,751 
(12,271) 
12.44 
(4.87) 
27,438 
(11,596) 
11.85 
(6.57) 
26,488 
(14,252) 
Observations 531 149 143 28 
1990 Cohort         
10th percentile 7.30 15,547 6.09 15,547 6.64 15,547 6.58 15,547 
50th percentile 10.52 21,881 9.62 21,881 9.88 21,881 8.79 21,881 
90th percentile 16.46 35,124 14.00 28,215 13.60 31,670 12.38 28,215 
Mean 11.37 
(4.44) 
25,100 
(10,262) 
10.19 
(3.84) 
21,887 
(7,986) 
10.33 
(3.62) 
22,648 
(7,897) 
9.45 
(3.24) 
21,837 
(8,089) 
Observations 681 197 766 132 
1995 Cohort Annual wage Annual wage Annual wage Annual wage 
10th percentile 11,839 11,839 11,839 11,839 
50th percentile 17,760 17,760 17,760 17,760 
90th percentile 30,676 27,447 27,447 24,218 
Mean 19,860 
(7,627) 
19,878 
(7,458) 
18,810 
(6,778) 
17,330 
(5,731) 
Observations 740 1058 1233 418 
 
Panel B: 
Men 
Russell Group 
Universities  
Old Universities  Modern 
Universities  
Other 
Institutions  
1985 Cohort Hourly 
pay 
Annual 
wage 
Hourly 
pay 
Annual 
wage 
Hourly 
pay 
Annual 
wage 
Hourly 
pay 
Annual 
wage 
10th percentile 9.86 24,760 8.12 19,000 9.34 21,881 9.52 24,760 
50th percentile 16.03 35,125 12.99 28,215 13.56 31,670 13.88 43,186 
90th percentile 26.58 69,098 22.15 51,823 22.15 69,098 21.78 69,098 
Mean 16.93 
(6.38) 
39,659 
(15,443) 
14.20 
(5.87) 
32,668 
(13,716) 
14.60 
(5.26) 
35,011 
(15,035) 
15.39 
(5.83) 
26,488 
(14,253) 
Observations 883 237 127 22 
1990 Cohort         
10th percentile 7.47 15,547 6.96 15,547 6.77 15,547 6.53 15,547 
50th percentile 11.90 24,760 10.98 24,760 10.58 24,760 9.14 21,881 
90th percentile 18.46 43,186 16.00 35,125 15.71 35,125 13.56 35,125 
Mean 12.64 
(4.99) 
29,220 
(12,425) 
11.78 
(5.14) 
26,574 
(11,541) 
11.29 
(4.40) 
25,564 
(9,912) 
9.78 
(3.20) 
23,578 
(9,039) 
Observations 663 220 752 76 
1995 Cohort Annual wage Annual wage Annual wage Annual wage 
10th percentile 14,531 14,531 11,839 11,839 
50th percentile 20,989 20,989 20,989 17,560 
90th percentile 37,134 33,905 30,676 27,447 
Mean 23,962 
(9,679) 
22,706 
(9,329) 
21,908 
(8,588) 
18,220 
(6,170) 
Observations 502 870 1116 113 
Note: Gross wages are expressed in GBP (price 2002).  For all cohorts, annual gross wage is reported in 
categorical form 
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Table 5: Linear estimates of institutional effects on gross wage   
 
Panel A:Women Specification  (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) Specification (4) 
1985 Cohort     
RG University 0.163  (5.45) 0.141 (4.30) 0.172 (4.39) 0.168 (4.40) 
Old University 0.043 (0.82) 0.034 (0.66) 0.055 (1.07) 0.060 (1.14) 
Other Institution -0.061 (0.73) -0.058 (0.70) -0.009 (0.09) 0.003 (0.03) 
R2 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.33 
1990 Cohort     
RG University 0.063 (3.55) 0.025 (1.52) 0.032 (1.59) 0.025 (1.20) 
Old University -0.002 (0.05) -0.023 (0.60) -0.024 (0.81) -0.029 (0.99) 
Other Institution -0.056 (3.53) -0.050 (3.15) -0.039 (2.27) -0.044 (2.54) 
R2 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.27 
1995 Cohort     
RG University 0.081 (2.53) 0.062 (1.71) 0.062 (2.26) 0.058 (2.11) 
Old University 0.083 (3.35) 0.066 (2.37) 0.082 (3.14) 0.077 (2.96) 
Other Institution -0.059 (2.57) -0.066 (2.66) -0.020 (0.78) -0.018 (0.70) 
R2 0.20 0.20 0.26 0.26 
 
Panel B:Men Specification (1) Specification (2) Specification (3) Specification (4) 
1985 Cohort     
RG University 0.111 (4.21) 0.038 (1.61) 0.052 (1.83) 0.047 (1.64) 
Old University 0.027 (0.96) -0.010 (0.33) 0.003 (0.10) 0.004 (0.13) 
Other Institution -0.050 (0.52) -0.093 (1.38) -0.136 (2.43) -0.133 (2.42) 
R2 0.30 0.32 0.36 0.36 
1990 Cohort     
RG University 0.091 (3.76) 0.046 (1.44) 0.049 (1.39) 0.044 (1.27) 
Old University 0.071 (1.56) 0.044 (1.02) 0.033 (0.93) 0.032 (0.94) 
Other Institution -0.141 (3.35) -0.144 (3.99) -0.117 (3.65) -0.120 (3.86) 
R2 0.27 0.27 0.32 0.33 
1995 Cohort     
RG University 0.124 (3.97) 0.111 (3.12) 0.101 (3.25) 0.094 (3.10) 
Old University 0.084 (3.02) 0.071 (2.25) 0.070 (2.36) 0.064 (2.28) 
Other Institution -0.100 (1.96) -0.096 (1.89) -0.031 (0.62) -0.031 (0.64) 
R2 0.25 0.25 0.31 0.32 
Note: Hourly wages are used for the 1985 and the 1990 cohort. Model (1) controls for a quadratic 
function in labour market experience, firm size, type of contract self-employment, race, region of 
residence and post-graduate qualifications. In Model (2) we add A-level scores. Model (3) is similar to 
(2) but also includes subject of graduation and degree grade. The full model (4) adds controls for type of 
school attended (cohort 1985 and 1990) or visit to information services (cohort 1995) and father’s 
occupation. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Matching estimates of graduating from a Russell Group institution on gross wage  
 Women Men 
 Estimate 
% matchedA 
(50%)B 
ObsC 
Estimate 
% matchedA 
(50%)B 
ObsC 
1985 Cohort     
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.1 0.155 (0.116) 
100% 
(4) 
-0.007 
(0.093) 
100% 
(5) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.1 0.170 (0.056) 531 
0.058 
(0.066) 883 
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.01 0.158 (0.097) 
86% 
(6) 
-0.006 
(0.098) 
96% 
(6) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.01 0.170 (0.064) 459 
0.009 
(0.070) 846 
OLS on matched sample  0.215 (0.050) 
N=535 
R2=0.08 
0.025 
(0.050) 
N=920 
R2=0.08 
1990 Cohort     
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.1 0.051 (0.037) 
100% 
(25) 
0.070 
(0.064) 
100% 
(14) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.1 0.021 (0.030) 681 
0.032 
(0.029_ 663 
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.01 0.053 (0.038) 
99% 
(26) 
0.066 
(0.068) 
93% 
(17) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.01 0.037 (0.033) 674 
0.045 
(0.031) 618 
OLS on matched sample  0.066 (0.031) 
N=858 
R2=0.08 
0.056 
(0.035) 
N=785 
R2=0.10 
1995 Cohort     
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.1 -0.014 (0.112) 
100% 
(8) 
0.151 
(0.076) 
100% 
(9) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.1 0.037 (0.028) 740 
0.069 
(0.039) 502 
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.01 0.079 (0.090) 
98% 
(8) 
-0.017 
(0.092) 
98% 
(9) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.01 0.024 (0.029) 724 
0.058 
(0.038) 491 
OLS on matched sample  0.001 (0.034) 
N=785 
R2=0.31 
0.108 
(0.065) 
N=545 
R2=0.39 
Note: The comparison group is drowned out of graduates from New Universities. Standard error 
calculated by bootstrap (500 replications). OLS uses the full control specification on the population of 
matched treated and control observations. Kernel estimates are obtained using Epanechnikov kernel. 
A Percentage of treated observations matched to a control observation (nearest neighbour) 
B Number of control observations responsible for 50% of the matches. 
C Number of treated observations 
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Table 7: Matching estimates of graduating from an old university on gross wage  
 
 Women Men 
 Estimates 
% matchedA 
(50%)B 
ObsC 
Estimates 
% matchedA 
(50%)B 
ObsC 
1985 Cohort     
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.1 -0.017 (0.066) 92% (13) -0.005 (0.070) 100% (13) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.1 0.012 (0.055) 138 -0.088 (0.053) 237 
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.05 -0.016 (0.066) 91% (13) -0.017 (0.066) 97% (14) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.05 0.004 (0.058) 137 -0.076 (0.057) 230 
OLS on matched sample  -0.038 (0.058) N=201 R2=0.10 
-0.055 
(0.054) 
N=301 
R2=0.116 
1990 Cohort     
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.1 -0.123 (0.036) 100%  (41) -0.001 (0.039) 99.6% (37) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.1 -0.061 (0.029) 197 0.025 (0.031) 219 
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.05 -0.110 (0.036) 99% (41) 0.002 (0.041) 98.6% (38) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.05 -0.065 (0.029) 195 0.020 (0.032) 217 
OLS on matched sample  -0.095 (0.037) N=330 R2=0.08 0.010 (0.037) 
N=357 
R2=0.133 
1995 Cohort     
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.1 -0.023 (0.088) 100% (9) 0.075 (0.090) 100% (8) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.1 0.053 (0.027) 1058 0.039 (0.035) 870 
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.01 -0.037 (0.080) 98% (8) 0.089 (0.108) 99% (8) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.01 0.042 (0.027) 1039 0.021 (0.037) 865 
OLS on matched sample  0.035 (0.042) N=1095 R2=0.33 0.073 (0.055) 
N=925 
R2=0.35 
Note: The comparison group is drowned out of graduates from New Universities. Standard error 
calculated by bootstrap (500 replications). OLS uses the full control specification on the population of 
matched treated and control observations. Kernel estimates are obtained using Epanechnikov kernel. 
A Percentage of treated observations matched to a control observation (nearest neighbour) 
B Number of control observations responsible for 50% of the matches. 
C Number of treated observations 
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 Table 8: Matching estimates of graduating from a Russell Group institution on wage growth 
 Women Men 
 Estimate 
% matchedA 
(50%)B 
ObsC 
Estimate 
% matchedA 
(50%)B 
ObsC 
1985 Cohort     
Growth 1986-1991     
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.1 0.302 (.510) 100% (4) 0.037 (0.316) 100% (5) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.1 0.234 (0.192) 343 0.292 (0.117) 682 
Growth 1991-1996     
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.1 0.164 (0.121) 100% (5) 0.047 (0.117) 100% (5) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.1 0.157 (0.068) 486 0.001 (0.083) 834 
1990 Cohort     
Growth 1991-1996     
Nearest Neighbour Cal 0.1 0.208 (0.106) 100% (20) 0.071 (0.180) 100% (15) 
Kernel Epan. Band 0.1 0.147 (0.082) 464 0.031 (0.128) 462 
 
Note: The comparison group is drowned out of graduates from New Universities. Standard error 
calculated by bootstrap (500 replications). Kernel estimates are obtained using Epanechnikov kernel. 
A Percentage of treated observations matched to a control observation (nearest neighbour) 
B Number of control observations responsible for 50% of the matches. 
C Number of treated observations 
 
 
 
Table 9: Annual fee differentials between graduates from Russell group institution and other 
graduates. 
 
 Annual fee differential 
Scenario 1: + 2% over life -time £2,950 
Scenario 2: + 5% over life -time £7,100 
Scenario 3: increasing differential1 £4,750 
Scenario 3: decreasing differential2 £7,250 
 
Note: Calculations based on LFS (2002) in GBP, 2002 prices 
1The pay differential of Russell group graduates over other graduates are 0%, 2%, 5% and 10% 
respectively over the following age groups: 21-30, 31-40, 41-50 and 51-60. 
2The pay differential of Russell group graduates over other graduates are 10%, 5% and 2% respectively 
over the following age groups: 21-30, 31-40, 41-50 and zero thereafter. 
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Appendix: Current University funding arrangements  
 
At present, the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) distributes funding from central 
government to Higher Education Institutions in England and Wales according to the research and 
teaching these institutions undertake.  
 
Teaching resources are allocated according to the number of full time students (and part time equivalent), 
however, there are several criteria for receiving additional funds depending on the subjects provided 
(‘clinical stage of medicine, dentistry and veterinary science’, ‘laboratory based subjects’, ‘subjects with 
a laboratory components’ and ‘other subjects’); the type of student (‘mature’, ‘part time’ and ‘students on 
long courses’); and the institution (‘London premium’, ‘pensions’, ‘specialist institutions’ and ‘old and 
historic buildings’) 
 
In addition to the funds for teaching, universities are eligible for research grants based on the 5 yearly 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). There are three components of quality related research (QR) as 
follows: Mainstream QR (allocated to reflect the quality and volume of research at institutions in 
different subjects); Funds for supervision of research students and London weighting (allocated to reflect 
the additional costs of provision in London) 
 
Mainstream QR funds are weighted according to the field of study (‘high cost laboratory and clinical 
subjects’, ‘intermediate cost subjects’ and ‘Others’) and adjusted according to the number of research 
active staff, the number of research fellows, research assistants, postgraduate research students and 
research income from charities. The number of research active staff is far and away the most important 
measure of volume.  
 
The quality of research is rated according to a scale ranging between 1 (worst) and 5* (best), which has 
funding weights associated with each score. The measure of volume and quality are the multiplied to 
calculate the allocation of resources to each institution. 
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Appendix: Propensity score matching 
 
We introduce the following notation: Y1 and Y0 are the earnings associated with graduation from a 
prestigious and a standard institution respectively. D is a dichotomous variable taking the value one for 
individual graduating from a prestigious institution (treatment).  
 
          (A1) 
 
As individuals are observed in only one state of the treatment, )1,/( 0 =DXYE  is never observed. In 
order to identify this parameter, a further assumption is needed. Matching, as with ordinary least squares, 
assumes the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), which is equivalent to assuming that the 
selection is only on observable characteristics. 
 
XDYY /)( 01 ^-        (CIA) 
 
The assumption of conditional independence between the outcome from and the selection into the 
programme imposes that the treated and non-treated population have on average the same outcome 
regarding the treatment effect31.  Thus, 
 
)/(),/(
)/(),/(
11
00
XyEDXyE
XyEDXyE
=
=
       (A2) 
 
In order to identify the average treatment on the treated, ordinary linear least squares further assumes 
homogeneity of the effect of the treatment; conditioning linearly on X, the effect of attending a 
prestigious institution is identical for all individuals. Rather than comparing individuals at different 
points of the X distribution, matching assumes that the CIA holds for individuals who have “similar” X. 
As a large number of covariates is usually required to imply CIA, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show 
that it is equivalent to condition on the estimated probability of being treated (Pr (D=1/X)=P(X)) or on all 
the dimensions of X.   
 
Various methods exist to implement matching estimates but they are all based on the same strategy of 
pairing individuals. They differ in the way the pairing is done or the weight given to a counterfactual 
individual. The generic formula is thus: 
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The expected outcome of no treatment for an individual i who attended a prestigious university is a 
weighted average of the earnings of individuals who did not go to such an institution, with the weight 
being attached to a given control (j) being a function of individuals i and j propensity scores. Basically, 
individuals who are the most similar to i in terms of observable characteristics (X) are given the highest 
weight. 
 
In the simplest matching method, the weighting function has the following form: the individual (j) whose 
propensity score is the closest to )(ˆ iXP  is given a weight of 1, all other individuals, receive a weighting 
of 0; this is known as nearest neighbour matching32. In order to improve on the quality of the match and 
thus reduce bias, it is possible to introduce a calliper to the nearest neighbour match. A calliper (cn) is 
                                                 
31 Heckman et al. (1997) note that the CIA is in fact stronger than required to estimate the ATET; in this case, all 
that is required is: )0,|()1,|( 00 === DXYEDXYE . Alternatively, if the parameter of interest is the 
Average Treatment Effect on the Non-Treated, it suffices to have: )0,|()1,|( 11 === DXYEDXYE . 
32 This can be conducted with or without replacement. In this application, the number of control observations in the 
common support area is small, thus in order to reduce bias we decided to match with replacement.  
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simply an ad hoc limit where a match with a difference in propensity score greater than cn is cancelled. 
The weighting function in the case of nearest neighbour with calliper is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If no match is found within the interval ])(ˆ,)(ˆ[ nini cXPcXP +-  observation i is discarded. 
Discarded individuals indicate that the existence of common support is not a reasonable assumption. An 
alternative to using a single control individual is to rely on a kernel to provide weights to a group of 
control observations.  
 
In this case, the weighting function becomes: 
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where K is the chosen kernel function and bn is a bandwidth defining the extent of the interval from 
which control observations are sought33.  
 
In finite samples, different matching estimators produce different estimates because of systematic 
differences in which observations are assigned a positive weight and how the support problem is handled. 
The nearest neighbour estimator minimizes bias, as it chooses only the closest control observation. 
Kernel estimates on the other hand use more controls, which increases the average distance between the 
treated and the synthetic control individual, but reduces the variance of the estimates. The same trade -off 
between bias and variance exist in the choice of the bandwidth. A small bandwidth reduces bias (in the 
limit, it is similar to a nearest neighbour match), while a larger bandwidth reduces variance by using 
more information. According to Pagan and Ullah (1999, p118), “the key questions about kernel 
estimators therefore devolve to selection of kernel and window width (bandwidth)”. However, the 
authors conclude that “in some ways it is still unclear whether automatic bandwidth selection is 
preferable to eye balling.” So we report estimates for two bandwidths. One of the advantages of the 
chosen matching methods is that they make explicit the common support assumption. 
 
 
                                                 
33 In this paper, we rely on the Epanechnikov kernel defined as follow: 
ïî
ï
í
ì <-
=
Otherwise  0
1||  if  )1(4
3
)(
2 jj
jK  
